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When it comes to the thought-provoking subject of foreign intervention in the Civil War, especially by 
Great Britain, much of the history has been more propaganda than proper research; fiction over fact. In 
1961, Kenneth Bourne offered up a fascinating article on “British Preparations for War with the North, 
1861–1862” for the English Historical Review. While focusing largely on the military defense of Canada 
during the Trent Affair, Bourne also stressed that Britain’s “position at sea was by no means so bad,” though 
he potentially confused the twentieth-century reader by referring to “battleships” rather than (steam-
powered, sail, and screw-propelled) wooden ships-of-the-line, for example. This blurred the important 
technological changes that were certainly in play by 1861—and not necessarily in Britain’s favor. The Great 
Lakes the British considered to be largely a write-off as there were no facilities in place for building 
ironclads, much less floating wooden gunboats up frozen rivers and canals during the long winter season. 
American commerce and industrialization in the Midwest, on the other hand, had led to booming local ports 
like Chicago, Detroit, Toledo, and Cleveland—all facilitated by new railroads. Of course, Parliament had 
not seen to maximizing the defense of the British Empire’s many frontiers and outposts over the years. If 
anything, the legendary reputation of the Royal Navy continually undermined that imperative. That left the 
onus of any real war against the United States to Britain’s ability to lay down a naval offensive. And while 
Bourne was content to trust the judgment of an anonymous British officer in Colburn’s United Service 
Magazine that “1273 guns” were available to Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Milne’s North American and 
West Indies naval forces during the Trent crisis, the same publication also went on to warn its contemporary 
British readers that “in calculating the power of the Northern States at sea, we must not be deluded by the 
ships actually in existence, but must reckon on those that may be built.”
1
 The author might have added that 
of the 86 guns of Milne’s flagship, HMS Nile, for example, or the 91 guns of the newer Agamemnon 
(launched in 1852 and reinforcing the British naval base at Bermuda from Gibraltar), no more than a third 
were 8-inch (65 cwt.
2
) shell-firing guns, the rest being 32-pounders in use since the Napoleonic era.
3
 In fact, 
the more deep-draft, screw-propelled ships-of-the-line the Admiralty dispatched to Milne, the more nervous 
he became. The 101-gun Conqueror ran aground in the Bahamas on December 13, 1861, a total loss. The 
British admiral pleaded for more shallow-draft paddle steamers, like those in use by the Union navy. Indeed, 
it was the lighter craft of the Yankees which proved better adapted for warfare in American waters.  
After news of the Battle of Hampton Roads (March 8–9, 1862), when the Confederate ironclad ram 
Virginia sank two Union frigates but was then duelled to a stop by the turreted, iron-hulled USS Monitor, 
Milne was even more explicit. “If these ships of the line now here were cut up into small vessels, they would 
be of use to me, but except for Demonstrations clear of Merrimac and Monitor, they are no use. . . .”
4
 
American warships were now all typically armed with 9-inch Dahlgren guns firing 90 lb. solid shot and 73 
lb. exploding shells. These bounced off the Virginia’s sloping armored casemate yet quickly blew the USS 
Congress and USS Cumberland to pieces. “The monitors might therefore have played havoc with any 
attempt by the older [British] frigates to maintain close blockade,” Bourne also conceded.
5
 That left the 
Royal Navy only a “distant blockade” in the age of steam—a pointless endeavor before wireless 
communications—and high seas warfare against American shipping (while British commerce worldwide 
suffered in turn from steam-powered cruisers—like the CSS Alabama—emerging from Northern ports only 
loosely screened by British warships). Meanwhile Canada would be at the mercy of the United States Army.  
This supports military historian Russell Weigley’s scorching conclusion that Palmerston’s naval arm 
of power diplomacy during the Civil War years “retained the appearance of maritime supremacy principally 
because it existed in a naval vacuum, with no serious rivals except for half-hearted and sporadic challenges 
by the French”: 
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At that, the British Navy would have had a difficult time making itself felt on the 
North American coast. The coming of steam power had destroyed the ability of its best 
warships to cruise indefinitely in American waters as the blockading squadrons had 
done in 1812. Even with a major base at Halifax, or possible aid from Confederate 
ports, the British Navy would have found it a precarious venture to try to keep station 
on the U.S. Coast. No steam navy operated with success against any reasonably 
formidable enemy at the distances from its home ports that a trans-Atlantic war would 
have imposed on the British fleet until the U.S. Navy fought the Japanese in World 





Yet despite these awkward points, some naval historians today, such as Andrew Lambert, prefer to 
sustain the image of overwhelming British superiority at sea and a helpless Union in peril. Here, the Royal 
Navy “relied on a technologically advanced offensive maritime strategy” throughout the nineteenth century. 
This strategy had apparently won the war against Russia in 1853–55 (not the Siege of Sevastopol or the 
French army). Even the ramparts of Bermuda as a crucial rallying point for any British campaign against the 
United States during the Civil War are given a whitewash by Lambert, for the danger of a “pre-emptive 
strike by the United States,” he writes, “was averted by a continuous program of defensive improvements 
that made [it] a major imperial fortress.” Yet the listed source for this counterfactual assertion, Roger 
Willcock’s Bulwark of Empire: Bermuda’s Fortified Naval Base 1860–1920, rather confirmed that the 
defending ordnance “was inferior in type and weight to the armament mounted aboard foreign warships; 
furthermore, the Dockyard defense works were generally second-rate inasmuch as many structures had been 
erected independent of the system of fortification”; while the garrison at St. George’s was “so shrunken by 
manpower demands of the Crimean campaigns there was hardly sufficient personnel to serve properly even 
one of the fifty-odd guns of the coastal batteries controlling the North Shore Channel Passages.” Willcock 
was also candid—like Milne 100 years before—about the inadequacy of any imperial dockyard to repair 
modern steam warships. Gigantic ironclads like HMS Warrior could not be docked at all, and yet it was 
their iron hulls that needed cleaning more than wooden-hulled vessels. “Conceived in the days of sail [the 
Bermuda dock’s] equipment had not kept pace with changing times,” noted Bulwark of Empire, “the base 
had become an anachronism for in the 1860’s it was better suited to maintain a sailing squadron of the 
1820’s than to service and support efficiently even a handful of steam-propelled ironclads.”
7
 Once again, 
after a closer analysis of British historical records, Lambert acknowledges that in fact the Royal Navy hoped 
for little more than a blockade of Northern ports even during the Trent crisis (i.e., when the Union had only 
been at war for eight months and its navy was still mobilizing
8
).  
So we can also jettison the darkly imaginative speculations of alternate history, such as Jack Green and 
Alessandro Massignani’s Ironclads at War.
9
 To be sure, historical “what ifs” have their uses. But serious 
historical studies of the period—say, diplomatic ones—tend to assume British “naval supremacy” without 
closely scrutinizing what that term actually meant. A recent article in the Canadian Journal of History by 
Francis M. Carroll quotes Palmerston’s assurance to Queen Victoria during the Trent Affair at face value: 
“If the Federal Government comply with the demands it will be honourable for England and humiliation for 
the United States. If the Federal Government refuse compliance, Great Britain is in a better state than at any 
former time to inflict a severe blow upon, and read a lesson to the United States which will not soon be 
forgotten.” Further, Carroll cites British naval historian Andrew Lambert’s avowal that the global balance of 
power was all about the Royal Navy deterring major nation-states and empires who were periodically made 
to “acknowledge British strength.” What constituted this strength in 1861, Lambert ultimately claims, were 
“the resources for a sustained coastal offensive campaign, including over 200 gunboats, mortar vessels, 
ironclads, and floating factories and deport ships acquired in 1856, with new rifled guns.”
10
 That helps 
explain the threat of British naval intervention; but why ignore the equally documented threat of Union 
countermeasures? Since when was the Civil War all about what foreign powers would do to America? And 
if Palmerston possessed such a winning hand, why play at all? Why not dictate British interests instead of 
engaging in the tactful diplomacy over intervention, neutral rights, and vehement US charges of British aid 
to the Confederacy which certainly dominated the remaining years of the conflict in America? Carroll does 
well in also quoting Palmerston’s initial warning to Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell in 1861: “They 
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who in quarrels interpose, will often get a bloody nose.” So where were Lambert’s “coastal offensive 
resources” when the prime minister needed them? Even Amanda Foreman’s wildly successful narrative of 
Britain and the American Civil War, A World on Fire: An Epic History of Two Nations Divided, cannot 
reconcile why Palmerston seemed so keen to unleash the Royal Navy against the Northern states during the 
Trent Affair, but within a year repeatedly held back cabinet colleagues Russell and William E. Gladstone 
(traditionally a strong opponent to Palmerstonian foreign policies) from accepting a French proposal to “co-
mediate” in America and bring an end to all the bloodshed—a question Lambert studiously ignores as well. 
Despite all the various political reasons offered up by Foreman and boastings of “supreme power” by 
Lambert, the critical factor explaining both ends of Palmerston’s foreign policy during the American Civil 




After 150 years, the time has come to question the immutability of “British naval supremacy.” “We 
are not, it is true, in a condition for war with Great Britain just at this time,” wrote US Secretary of the Navy 
Gideon Welles in August 1862, “but England is in scarcely a better condition for a war with us.”
12
 The 
British had a large standing navy, to be sure—the largest. But neither can we say this force was make-or-





This paper’s arguments rest upon three main, interconnected points:  
 
1. The mid-Victorian British were not willing to go to the necessary trouble of fully mobilizing for a      
major naval and maritime showdown; the Union’s own rapid and costly naval mobilization served to 
counterdeter, in wartime, the latent deterrent force represented by the Royal Navy during the so-
called Pax Britannica. 
2. British naval power, at any rate, was strategically hamstrung by the needs of the British Empire 
worldwide, both in terms of imperial defense and the aggressive pursuit of national interests. At 
home the prime minister, Lord Palmerston, was preoccupied with the expansion of French ambitions 
backed by a new ironclad fleet purpose-built to fight in European waters. 
3. In terms of naval and military technology, Britain was heavily committed to building the wrong kind 
of ironclads—like HMS Warrior—needed to win a war in American waters. As John Ericsson, the 
inventor of the USS Monitor, assured Secretary of State William H. Seward, “The expedients now 
adopted by the Admiralty to avert the dangers to England suggested by the recent developments in 
naval warfare, tend to prove that this country now occupies the vantage ground.”
13
 This was not the 
“age of the shark” but the “turtle,” with coastal defense quietly trumping coastal offense, as emerging 
industrial nation-states struggled to shield, consolidate, and magnify their own destinies.  
 
In essence, this was the Monroe Doctrine at work in the American republic’s supreme hour of need, 
and even John Quincy Adams in 1823 was wary and resentful of the notion that America’s interests, or its 
navy, should “come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war.” Uncle Sam’s fate was not 
going to be left to a capricious and self-serving “Mistress of the Seas” to decide. Nearly 40 years later, it was 
left for his son, Charles Francis Adams, as ambassador to Great Britain during the Civil War, to gauge how 
quickly circumstances changed the tone of British power politics—namely the debut of the Yankee Monitor 
at the Battle of Hampton Roads. “In December [during the Trent Affair] we were told that we should be 
swept from the ocean in a moment, and all our ports would be taken,” he wrote to his own son, Charles 
Francis Jr. “They do not talk so now. So far as this may have a good effect to secure peace on both sides it is 
good.”
14
 The London Times, however, was rather bitter about the news, and on April Fool’s Day, 1862, had 




For one thing, most of the fleet was laid up in “ordinary” or “steam reserve”
16
 at any given time; 
many of the vessels on the Navy List were old, obsolete, and in need of repairs. During an emergency it took 
months to get them refitted, manned, and properly mobilized. A Parliamentary Return, or report, on the 
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“Number of Steam Ships Afloat and Building,” dated February 1862 (that is, a month after the resolution of 
the Trent Affair), listed 57 screw-propelled ships-of-the-line (many of them retrofitted conversions), with 4 
more building; 44 screw frigates; 24 corvettes; 48 sloops; 197 gunboats; and 7 iron-armored floating 
batteries (left over from the Crimean War, six years before); with 4 ironclad frigates built and another 11 
building. But of the floating batteries, for example, 4 were never commissioned, and only 1—HMS 
Terror—was deployed on foreign service (at Bermuda). Her iron hull was thickly encrusted with marine 
growth as the years rolled on, crippling her effectiveness for anything other than harbor defense, and it was 
difficult to find enough crew to man her guns.
17
 
Keeping every vessel shipshape all the time simply cost more than Parliament or the British taxpayer 
was willing to pay. Hulls had to be cleaned and caulked, rigging and boilers replaced.
18
 But neither was it 
considered cost-effective to sell the bulk of this fleet to the breakers—to scrap inefficiency in the name of 
economy. It was still less expensive to overhaul an old ship than build a new one. When Parliament asked 
for the current strength of the navy four months later, in June 1862, there were still only four (partially 
armored) ironclad frigates completed: Warrior, her sister ship Black Prince, and the two smaller and slower 
versions, Defence and Resistance.
19
 Six more iron-hulled, partially armored, ironclad frigates were under 
construction—four large and two small—as well as eight wooden-hulled broadside ironclads, four of which 
were conversions from second-rate wooden ships-of-the-line and three of which were classed as sloops, 
mounting only four to eight guns in a central “box.” Within six years, however, the influential controller of 
the navy Admiral Robert Spencer Robinson was ready to dump most of the wooden steam ships-of-the-line 
and other (nonironclad) men-of-war still on the books; they were far too expensive to maintain in reserve 
indefinitely, while “their value as tested by what can be realized for them is next to nothing.”
20
  
The same went for manning a big navy; crews were mustered when a major task force was needed 
here or there. Once the tour of duty was over, the men were paid off and the ships laid up. The fighting trim 
aspect of British naval power throughout most of the nineteenth century was therefore divided up into 
patrolling squadrons and scattered all over the globe. Even in the early Age of the Ironclad, the “government 
could not do away with their wooden ships, as they required a vast number of such vessels to perform the 
duties of what might be termed the police of the sea,” noted one Admiralty spokesman in a House of 
Commons debate in April 1864. Likewise, they were “obliged, to a great extent, to put their forces upon the 
same footing as those of other countries.”
21
 So there was a battle fleet at home in the English Channel, 
especially from 1860 during the latest invasion scare with France, and there was another cluster of 
battleships based in the Mediterranean to safeguard British interests in Europe as well as the major supply 
line to and from India. The rest of the various stations, namely North America and the West Indies and the 
Far East/China, were flagged with a battleship or two. But nearly all station squadrons were (rightly) 
dominated by frigates—by cruisers—and by lighter sloops and corvettes. Defending Britain’s imperial 
frontier was much more about occasionally “showing the flag” at colonial outposts, intimidating local tribes 
and despots into favorable trade concessions, or getting far-flung British explorers, missionaries, and 
soldiers of fortune out of hotspots (usually of their own making). 
Even then, between the end of the Crimean War in 1856 and the end of the Civil War in 1865, the 
British Empire was at war in Iran, India, China, New Zealand, West Africa, and Japan. There were 
American filibuster expeditions threatening Central America in 1856, a joint Franco-Spanish-British 
expedition against Mexico in 1861, and a major uprising against colonial rule in Jamaica in 1865. 
Palmerston, meanwhile, sent naval squadrons to intimidate Spain over Morocco, the French over Savoy and 
Nice, and the Neapolitans over Naples. By 1866 the British had begun intervening against the Boers in 
South Africa. It was because of overextended strategic interests like these that most imperial defenses were 
continually deprived of the necessary funding insisted upon by military and naval professionals of 
successive British governments, and that fortifications (like those at Bermuda or Halifax or the West Indies) 
tended to wither on the vine, decade after decade. When a real crisis erupted—like the Trent in November 
1861—it did not matter if politicians suddenly woke up to the danger, because by then it was too late to 
establish effective defensive works armed with adequate, modern guns, build dry-docks, or facilitate proper 
coal depots and arsenals. “If units of the Royal Navy in the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Pacific had attempted to 
carry out all their orders,” historian Gordon H. Warren therefore concluded, “they not only would have 
failed, but also would have exhausted themselves trying.” Andrew Lambert’s objection that this assessment 
only took into account “a fraction of what would have been sent for active operations” and that “the British 
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had the power to inflict fatal damage on the Union” is not only unsupported by the evidence we have 
available—including contemporary testimony on both sides of the Atlantic—but ignores the fact that aside 




Under Emperor Napoleon III (Napoleon Bonaparte’s nephew), the Second French Empire 
consolidated its conquest of Algeria in North Africa, occupied Rome, annexed Savoy and Nice, intervened 
against Syria, and invaded Indochina (Vietnam). It then became clear that the emperor was determined to 
make Mexico a puppet state of France. The Crimean War gave the lion’s share of glory to French arms, 
which then defeated Austria in 1859. The imperial French army was thereby perfectly positioned to 
command the destiny of Italy—and, it seemed, all of Europe—all over again. Meanwhile, Napoleon built up 
a powerful, uniform fleet of ironclad frigates. The first armored battleship in history, the Gloire, was 
launched in Toulon in 1859 and posed a real threat to any British warship afloat until HMS Warrior was 
finally ready in August 1861—a year after Gloire was already steaming to and fro, uncontested. Historians 
today more often declare the British frigate was vastly superior, but Gloire was only a knot or two slower 
and was fully armored all along her waterline and gun deck.
23
 The French went right on improving on this 
design concept, outnumbering the British until 1864—and by then the Union navy outnumbered them both 
with ironclads perfectly adapted to fighting for control of American waters. Napoleon might have stood 
aside while the British threw everything they had into trying to protect their imperial possessions and 
commerce worldwide, while mobilizing for any kind of offensive against the United States. But given all the 
abuse heaped upon him by the British press going into the Civil War years—given the anti-French coastal 
forts that Palmerston in his paranoia had insisted upon in vicious debates in Parliament, openly suggesting 
the emperor was himself obsessed with humiliating Britannia “in revenge for Trafalgar and Waterloo”
24
—
why would he not expect major map-changing concessions in exchange? Every embarrassment suffered by 
the Royal Navy, every proud British ironclad lost to a Yankee mine or monitor, would play into French 
hands perfectly. 
In reviewing the latest panic-ridden reports from British military and naval officers returning from a 
wide-ranging tour of North America’s inadequate defenses—and the Union’s comparatively powerful war 
machine—Chancellor of the Exchequer William Gladstone, at least, did not see British society about to 
mobilize to anywhere near the same extremes. One million pounds was needed immediately to begin 
upgrading Canada’s weakest points; a canal would have to be built “from Ottawa to Huron,” he quoted, “‘as 
the very first and most necessary step to enable British vessels of war to enter Lake Ontario’”; new 
dockyards, more roads—the list was endless. Worse than that, the more Britain increased its defenses—and 
brandished them before the Americans—the more they might “entangle [Britain] in a long course of 
probably both dangerous and costly embarrassments, without securing the attainment of any useful end”: 
 
It appears to me that the time is now come for us to show whether all that has recently been said 
about our calling on the Colonies to bear their full share of military burdens has a meaning or 
not, and whether we do or do not mean to alter our system of Colonial defence with reference to 
altered circumstances of capability, power, and privilege . . . it is not the simple matter of money 
that is in view; it is the peril of committing the honour of this country to the assumption of an 






If, therefore, the Royal Navy was the global policeman of the nineteenth century, then he was armed 
with a baton and walkie-talkie only. Had someone challenged him with a gun in their neighborhood, the 
policeman would retreat if he knew what was good for him, and call in reinforcements. We therefore have to 
take with a grain of salt the claims of some “Imperial Defence” historians that the “real basis of British 
deterrence was the long-matured and recently demonstrated power of the Royal Navy to conduct large-scale 
offensive operations against the best defended harbours in the world as the core of a unique maritime 
warfighting capability.”
26
 Instead, as evidenced by a Commons debate on Britain’s peacetime “war 
economy” in early May 1862, Palmerston was able to call forth cheers from both sides of the House in 
defense of “bloated armaments” (against no less a speaker than Benjamin Disraeli): “He objects to military 
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power, he objects to naval power, he objects to moral power. It is difficult then to say what power we ought 
to exercise for the purpose of maintaining our proper position among the nations of the world.” The British 
Empire was expressly not in a commanding position vis-à-vis foreign powers, and in terms of Anglo-
American relations explicitly, the British needed French cooperation to give them “that respect and 
influence which I am proud to say we possess in the councils of the American Government.” Should the 
Royal Navy be strong? Of course. Yet Palmerston insisted before the nation that  
 
the policy of the present Government is, and the policy of the Government to which he belonged 
was, not to prepare for aggression, but to organize such a system of defensive preparation that 
we might go into the concert of Europe either with France singly, or with other powers in 
addition, as a country standing upon its own defence—strong enough to defend itself against any 
who might attack it; and therefore not giving counsel out of fear, doing nothing out of 
apprehension, not yielding obedience from alarm at the consequences which might follow its 
refusal, but speaking freely, frankly, and openly, as men do who are sure that they incur no 
danger by the honest expression of their opinions.  
 
This was also a lesson recently imparted to Lincoln’s administration over the Trent crisis—that the 
offensively strong might dictate to the defensively weak if he was not careful. But even here, Great Britain’s 
most popular and aggressive Prime Minister—whose “patriotic sentiments appealed to the self-confidence of 
the nation,” Winston Churchill observed 100 years later—judged that “had it not been for the temper, good 
sense, and conciliatory disposition on the part of both Governments, it is difficult to say what might not have 
grown out of such an occurrence.”
27
  
Privately, Palmerston was always keen for England to be as powerful on the naval offense as possible. 
It opened up strategic possibilities as well as “moral influence” in the mutable ranking of states on the global 
stage. Publicly, however, a clearly militant policy was harder to sell to representative bodies like Parliament 
or Congress who jealously controlled, as much as possible, the public budget for preserving peace and 
avoiding wars. Palmerston talked tough, inasmuch as every proud Englishman craved prestige in world 
affairs. But he was also a master of the naval-diplomatic bluff, of high-stakes brinksmanship. “In doing so 
he had created a myth of British foreign policy,” observed biographer Muriel E. Chamberlain, “which did 
not even conform very closely to his actual policy. His real policy was usually cautious, intricate and 
carefully adjusted to what could actually be achieved.”
28
  
Thus, even in terms of military and naval strategy, it was far easier to present a formidable defense to 
wreck any potential offensive thrust and at least thereby maintain one’s political independence. This is what 
Britain really invested her energies in during the Civil War years, and why. The hallmark of Palmerston’s 
last ministry (1859–1865) was not a coastal assault flotilla of ironclads capable of deadly-efficient work 
against distant shores, but a vast and expensive series of coastal fortifications designed to nullify any French 
naval raid on British dockyard arsenals like Portsmouth or a full-scale invasion of southern England. If 
nothing else, the British “were too cautious,” argued historian Michael Partridge: 
 
It would have been difficult enough in peacetime for the French to gather an invasion fleet and 
get it across the Channel without the British knowing about it. In war, it would have been all but 
impossible. The French simply did not have the resources to launch such an attack, as some 




The same might be said for transatlantic British ventures. And this also explains why Lincoln, not 
Palmerston, ultimately held the advantage in any hostile contest of strength. In a war against the Northern 
states during the Civil War, the British would have had to rely upon two bases to implement a blockade 
against the Union: Halifax and Bermuda. The latter base was over 700 miles from Hampton Roads, Virginia, 
for example—three to four days away;
30
 Halifax was nearly 600 miles from New York City. Both imperial 
bases were lightly defended by land and sea, with dockyards too meager and undersized to facilitate repairs 
of large vessels, let alone accommodate large flotillas for coastal operations.
31
 Coal would have had to be 
continuously shipped over from the British Isles, 2,800 miles away from Halifax and 3,400 miles from 
Bermuda. That meant long, unprotected supply lines, or mobilizing large elements of slow, outdated wooden 
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vessels (and their crews) for escort.
32
 During the Trent Affair, the first thing the Admiralty therefore had to 
do was ship over 10,000 tons of coal to Bermuda and the West Indies in a hurry.
33
 But neither was the local 
commander in chief, Vice Admiral Sir Milne, about to rush into coastal bombardment of New York City or 
Boston. One ambitious report at the time from Captain John Washington, hydrographer of the Royal Navy, 
suggested New York might be attacked, but only if the floating batteries were mobilized, safely made it 
across the Atlantic, and were accompanied by all of the navy’s armored frigates available—four of them at 
best (and again, these were only partially armored—even the slow, unwieldy floating batteries had no deck 
armor and were thus extremely vulnerable to plunging shot from forts on high ground and mortar fire).
34
  
But all this assumed the Americans would not implement effective countermeasures in time. Since 
Milne was not about to go rushing in until the navy was mobilized enough to risk major operations and he 
could see to the protection of his own bases and the safety of his supply lines, then we can safely assume 
that Union obstructions, minefields, and guns would be more or less ready. By 1862 the Union army had 
already deployed 15-inch caliber smoothbore guns (actually noted in Washington’s report) which could blast 
any armor scheme afloat even after the Civil War ended in 1865 with monstrous projectiles weighing 450 
pounds.
35
 Even the navy’s 11-inch Dahlgren guns (introduced in 1856 and firing 166-pound solid shot and 
explosive shells of 133 pounds) were found to seriously damage, if not altogether penetrate, 4.5-inch-thick 
iron plating backed by 20 inches of solid oak at point-blank battle ranges; enough to cripple the British 
floating batteries and play havoc with the unarmored ends of the iron frigates.
36
 “It is stated by the American 
papers that the Warrior could not enter New York Harbour on account of her great draught of water, and 
therefore she would be unable to take any part in engaging the forts,” Colburn’s United Service Magazine 
complacently observed in January 1862. “As there is little probability that any American frigate would have 
the temerity to engage her in single combat at sea, the Warrior would not be found to be of much service in 
an American war.” All this was regrettable since “we ourselves have heard several persons, not members of 
Mr. Bright’s bloody-minded aristocracy, but sober-minded citizens belonging to the middle classes express 
regret that England was not able to go and thrash the Yankees and pay them off for their innumerable insults 
to this country.” As it turned out, while the author admitted that “most of us feel a kind of pride and 
satisfaction in having by threats of immediate war compelled these bragging Americans to give in to our 
demands,” it was the Royal Navy and its champion, the Warrior, which luckily escaped a humiliating defeat 
in the mid-nineteenth century—especially had she or one of her sister ships challenged a Union monitor 
during the American Civil War.
37
 “Only think of our position,” Russell grumbled to Palmerston, “if in case 
of the Yankees turning upon us they should by means of iron ships renew the triumphs they achieved in 
1812–13 by means of superior size and weight of metal.”
38
  
The British warships were Blue Water liabilities against Brown Water ironclads of innately heavier 
(though fewer) guns and thicker, more concentrated iron shielding. The coast was the United States Navy’s 
strategic and tactical edge because it allowed American ironclad designers to capitalize on the existing limits 
of technology in a rapidly evolving age of steam and iron (which John Ericsson himself helped pioneer). 
Sails, masts, and rigging were dispensed with in both Union and Confederate ironclads. Shallow draft 
allowed closer engagement with enemy forts, enabling greater accuracy in the smoke and confusion of 
battle, or the ability to seek cover under friendly gun emplacements if need be. Time and money also 
favored the Americans in any ironclad arms race against Britain. The original Monitor was launched in 100 
days and cost six times less than the Warrior, which took a year and a half to build. The designs of the two 
“model” vessels, even to this day (namely, the restored Warrior at Portsmouth and the recovered gun turret 
and full-scale mock-up of the USS Monitor at the Mariner’s Museum in Newport News, Virginia), defy 
what an ironclad was really all about. The Times tried to reassure its audience that, if anything, the Warrior 
was a superior specimen of ironclad to either crude American version. The Illustrated London News, 
however, had its doubts: 
 
Is the Warrior itself a match for the Monitor? It is useless now to talk of speed and 
magnificence. We don’t want our war ships to run away successfully, or to be looked at 
admiringly, but to fight. How would the Monitor deal with the Warrior? The guns of the first 
send shot of 170lb.; the guns of the second, shots of 100lb…Again, the Monitor is practically 
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So unless Palmerston was willing and able to convince the British public to mobilize for a major war 
against the United States, the existing strength and resources of the Royal Navy were unquestionably unable 
to seriously threaten Lincoln’s government, from a few months after the Trent Affair of late 1861. When the 
Prime Minister’s cabinet debated intervening in the Civil War in the autumn of 1862, the secretary for war 
had to remind his colleagues that in such an event “the wooden ships of Europe would encounter the small 
iron-cased steamers of America, which, though not sea-going ships, would prove destructive in the ports and 
rivers.” By the beginning of 1863, the Controller of the Navy declared that the Americans were now 
“practically unassailable in their own waters” and that successful offensive operations by the Royal Navy 
against the US coastline were “simply impossible.”
40
 A year later, Palmerston was sorely vexed that despite 
new warships launched, armed with heavier guns, and the French ironclad threat now seemingly mastered, 
only new light-draft floating batteries would be able to help keep the strategically crucial St. Lawrence River 
open in the event of hostilities with the Northern states, requiring experimental new “heavy guns to be put 
into them which would smash and sink the Monitors.” All of this, he complained, was “not very satisfactory 
as it is all about what is to be.”
41
  
Indeed, as a British journalist and naval pundit warned in 1863, “With moderate forethought England 
has nothing to fear from France, but possesses a dangerous rival in the United States.” This was partially 
because of America’s natural and human resources, partially because of the rival labor system, but mostly 
because the Royal Navy was building the wrong types of ironclad for war against an enemy’s coast. “Give 
us ships,” he wrote, “and we will fight the devil”: 
 
With ironclad ships of war of small tonnage this country would effectually overawe America, 
because such ships could ascend the St. Lawrence river and the Lakes, descend into Lake 
Champlain, and even threaten the Upper Mississippi across the Illinois Canal. But with large 
ships only we are really at the mercy of America. America may in such a case attack us, while 
comparatively little injury could be inflicted in return. With an efficient fleet of small craft we 
could lay waste the whole region of the Lakes and the Mississippi, while our large ships inflicted 




But instead Britain had chosen a traditional high-seas battle fleet for its diplomatic balance-of-power 
posturing. This took more time to build, and was quickly rendered obsolete by the time ships were launched 
by the latest advances in guns and armor plate, requiring constant and expensive upgrades. By March 1864 
the sense of British Liberal compromise over defense spending hardened into rueful reflection in the Times, 
as Prussia invaded Denmark—and Britain watched from the sidelines. The country might “throw 30,000 
men on any point of any coast, and subsidize ten times as many more.” But if “we wish to stand as France 
stands, we must pay as France pays for the privilege;—that is to say, we must prepare ourselves for largely 
increased taxations, and deficits after all”: 
 
When a man who will not fight except under irresistible pressure interferes in a quarrel, and 
wishes the combatants to accept his judgment, we know what words he is likely to get. But this 
“humiliation,” such as it is, is the inevitable incident of such a policy as we have chosen.  
 
By November 1865, with the Civil War in America long ended, the Times also relented that a “perfect 
Ironclad is an imperfect seaboat”: 
 
That is the maxim which up to this time might be reasonably propounded as the deduction from 
all our experience. The best illustration of the doctrine was given by the American Monitors. 
Probably no fabric ever combined a greater capacity for fighting with a smaller capacity for 






The mid-Victorian Royal Navy—like the British Empire itself—was, to quote big business 
nomenclature of today, “too big to fail.” Naval technology, especially in terms of coastal defense capabilities 
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(from “monster guns” on forts and shallow-draft monitors to increasingly sophisticated underwater threats), 
drove up the risks while nationalism depreciated any potential profit from deterrence through strength—that 
is, the threat of coastal offense.
44
 The British had too much to lose by running their hyped, oversized 
ironclads aground and not enough to gain. The Crimean War was feared to be distraction enough to tempt 
the Americans in Central America, the Chinese in Canton, and then “mutineers” in India. What if a British 
task force was repulsed by the Northern states? Russia and France were surely watching closely for the first 
sign of weakness. Drunk on their victory at sea, the “insatiable land-hungry Yankees” would follow up with 
an invasion of Canada. Just as Palmerston could boast that a quick, easy victory against a relatively weak 
opponent in one corner of the globe meant that “every country that has towns within cannon shot of deep 
water will remember the operations of the British Fleet whenever such country has any differences with 
us,”
45
 a naval defeat might quickly unravel the self-serving strategic world order that Britain had 
meticulously fought for and maintained since at least 1784, the year of Palmerston’s birth and the 
ratification by Congress of the Treaty of Paris, which ended the American Revolutionary War. Despite the 
breathtaking chauvinism of British naval revisionists (or “anti-declinists”) who hold that the Royal Navy 
was not just the “Shield of Empire” but that “every great power with a significant sea coast” was “under the 
Heel of Britannia,”
46
 the simple fact is that during the American Civil War, British politicians had so little 
faith in the Royal Navy’s ability to protect the Empire that in 1865 they passed the Colonial Naval Defence 
Act, effectively allowing Australia, for example, to start up its own navy to provide for its own defense. 
Further, the British North America Act of 1867 completed a process whereby Canada became 
“confederated,” with its own government. For British complicity in prolonging the Civil War and damaging 
the Union’s merchant marine, the United States was successfully able to sue Great Britain for $15.5 million 
in gold: the Alabama Claims and the 1871 Treaty of Washington.  
What we are prone to forget is how easy it is to lose on the attack and win on the defense in war, even 
at sea. England’s own victorious naval tradition began with the repulse of the Spanish Armada in 1588. But 
Great Britain’s attempt to project overwhelming naval power against Cartagena’s combined defenses in 
1741—two years after the popular new poem “Rule Britannia!” loudly proclaimed the Royal Navy was now 
“The dread and envy of them all” and that “All thine shall be the subject main, And every shore it circles 
thine”—was an unmitigated disaster, something that too many naval historians (often busy scribbling away 
about Trafalgar and Lord Nelson) have pointedly ignored, though it cost Britain’s first prime minister, Sir 
Robert Walpole, his government.
47
 This coincides with the hackneyed comparisons between HMS Warrior 
and USS Monitor, for example, which state that the former was categorically superior because she was 
bigger—when the greatest maritime war in modern history, the Pacific in World War II, featured the sinking 
of the largest aircraft carrier in the world, Imperial Japan’s Shinano, by a diminutive American submarine 
(the USS Archerfish). Nor is the faulty reasoning limited to lay history buffs. In his highly revisionist 
account of English Public Opinion and the American Civil War, Duncan Andrew Campbell declares that 
“the Royal Navy, with its ocean-going ironclads, was always more than a match for the northern navy.” 
Citing David Paul Crook’s The North, the South and the Powers, 1861–1865, Campbell assures his readers 
that “Britain had a marked world lead in armoured warships . . . made for the high seas, whereas the 
Americans’ ships tended to capsize.”
48
 Captain John Wells, RN, in The Immortal Warrior: Britain’s First 
and Last Battleship, offers an interesting appendix on the “Warrior in battle” next to French ironclads’ 
strengths and weaknesses, including a comparison of size, tonnage, draft, armor and armament, and speed. If 
the Warrior or the Black Prince had been sent to intervene in the American Civil War, he asserts, “they 
could have coped quite easily with Monitor, Merrimac and any of the Federal frigates.” Again no suggestion 
of evidence is provided. Furthermore, the 1976 Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea retorts to John 
Ericsson’s naming of the Monitor as a warning to British authorities by noting that “Downing Street, in fact, 
viewed the Monitor with complete indifference, having two years earlier launched the Warrior, which could 
have blown fifty Monitors out of the water.”
49
 
Thus, to paraphrase Lincoln, we must disenthrall ourselves from the “dogmas of the quiet past”: 
that “Britannia ruled the waves” or that the nineteenth century saw a Pax Britannica.
50
 One does not 
voluntarily give up power; the British did not give the United States its independence in the eighteenth 
century any more than they granted it to India in the twentieth. And the mid-Victorians only backed 
away from their empire, retreating into so-called splendid isolation from the mid-nineteenth century, 
because they realized there was little choice. The great tipping point of British interventionism in the 
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Age of Palmerston—Britain’s most aggressive prime minister and no lover of American society, 
government, or national power—was the Civil War. “The U.S. have no navy of which we need be 
afraid,” the 70-year-old “Mongoose” wrote in a cabinet memo of 1854, “& they might be told that if 
they were to resort to privateering, we should however reluctantly be obliged to retaliate by burning all 
their Sea Coast Towns.”
51
 But Lincoln was characteristically able to liken the Anglo-American balance 
of power in North America to “two fields separated by a fence”—the fence in this case being the sea: 
 
In each field there was a big bulldog, and these dogs spent the whole day racing up and down, 
snarling and yelping at each other through that fence. One day they both came at the same 
moment to a hole in it, big enough to let either of them through. Well, gentlemen, what do you 
think they did? They just turned tail and scampered away as fast as they could in opposite 
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